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Abstract: Patent pools have been promoted as an innovative means of promoting the production of fixed-dose 
combination antiretroviral medicines (ARVs), which can be particularly appropriate for resource-poor settings. An 
important question, however, is what are the implications of patent pools on innovation for creating new and improved 
antiretrovirals. Indeed, given the continuing mutation of HIV and growing resistance to existing treatments, continued 
innovation in ARV development is vital for addressing these challenges. Would patent pools be a hindrance or rather a 
stimulus for further innovation? This question is particularly relevant in light of UNITAID’s initiative to create a patent 
pool for ARV development, focusing on pediatric formulations and new combinations, by the end of 2009. 
In this article, the author argues that a voluntary and well-designed patent pool, involving both innovative and generic 
manufacturers, focused on developing fixed-dose combinations for resource-poor markets with the greatest need, could 
actually stimulate increased innovation to meet these needs. Indeed, by bringing together the major ARV producers 
worldwide to collaborate on developing products which will meet the needs of the poorest, an ARV patent pool could 
create significant public health benefits. UNITAID has taken the lead in designing and implementing such a pool and 
UNITAID’s experience will have important lessons for policy-makers in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
  Patent pools have been promoted as an innovative means 
of promoting the production of fixed-dose combination 
antiretroviral medicines (ARVs), which can be particularly 
appropriate for resource-poor settings [1]. As other authors 
in this issue will have presented, the use of a patent pool 
could be used to overcome possible patent-based barriers to 
combining products from a variety of producers. 
  An important additional question, however, is what are 
the implications of patent pools on innovation for creating 
new and improved antiretrovirals. Indeed, given the 
continuing mutation of HIV and growing resistance to 
existing treatments, continued innovation in ARV 
development is vital for addressing these challenges. Would 
patent pools be a hindrance or rather a stimulus for further 
innovation? This question is particularly relevant in light of 
UNITAID’s initiative to create a patent pool for ARV 
development, focusing on pediatric formulations and new 
combinations, by the end of 2009. 
CRITIQUES OF PATENT POOLS’ IMPACT ON 
INNOVATION 
  The answer to the above question depends greatly upon 
how the proposed patent pool would be organized and how it 
would be set up. A major critique of proposals to include 
current and future ARVs in patent pools is the concern that 
such inclusion may actually dis-incentivize innovation in   
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ARVs. According to this argument, a patent pool would act 
as a group compulsory license, depriving patent-holders of 
their rights in growing markets around the world and giving 
the fruits of their R&D investment to copiers for little 
compensation, if any. In such a system, the fear would be 
that any new ARVs would be automatically included in the 
patent pool, thus reducing the possibility for the innovator to 
recoup his or her R&D investment for these medicines. 
Furthermore, some observers have expressed concerns 
regarding the quality of combination products which have 
not been approved by major, industrialized-country 
regulatory authorities and, by implication, have indicated 
that patent pools would lead to lower-quality products being 
developed by copy companies without sufficient regulatory 
oversight. 
  While the above points are indeed important concerns, a 
well-designed patent pool could address them and, in doing 
so, stimulate further innovation by bringing new partners 
into the global R&D effort to produce new and improved 
ARVs. 
  With regard to the “group compulsory license” argument, 
a voluntary patent pool would be the ideal solution. If 
innovators could be sufficiently convinced of the benefits of 
contributing their patents into the pool, that would promote 
voluntary collaboration in ARV development. For example, 
if the designers of a patent pool could show the innovators 
how combining the products can produce a superior product 
(in terms of efficacy, adherence to treatment regimens, lower 
patient cost, possibly improved production capacity, etc.), 
that could be helpful in convincing them to include their 
patents in a pool, particularly if that pool is limited in terms 
of geographic scope. Furthermore, governments and/or 
international procurement agencies could provide incentives 
for participation in the patent pool. Such incentives could 68    The Open AIDS Journal, 2010, Volume 4  Eric Noehrenberg 
include: advance market commitments to procure large 
volumes of medicines developed via  the patent pool; 
allowing the procurement of drugs developed via the patent 
pool at a certain premium; or other financial or market-based 
incentives. 
  The geographic scope is important in light of the second 
critique concerning patent pools, that such pools could 
reduce incentives for further innovation. The countries which 
are most affected by the AIDS pandemic are low-income 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the leading 
innovating producers of ARVs have publicly stated that they 
are offering their products to these countries at a “at cost” or 
even “below cost” basis. If this is indeed the case, then there 
would be no “lost” financial incentives if alternative 
producers also were to manufacture ARVs for these markets 
using the patent pool. Furthermore, if products are indeed 
being offered at a “below cost” basis, it should be in the 
innovator’s interest to involve other partners in order to 
share the burden of the cost of production and distribution to 
reach these “below cost” markets. 
  With respect to the issue of drug quality of ARVs 
developed via a patent pool, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) is already providing a reliable and objective system 
for approving such drugs through WHO’s “Prequalification 
System” (PQS) [2]. By using experienced experts from inter-
nationally-recognized drug regulatory authorities, WHO’s 
PQS helps to assure that the products reviewed and approved 
by them meet international quality standards, giving important 
guidance to national procurement authorities so that these 
authorities can avoid producers of inferior or even counterfeit 
quality. WHO’s PQS has even “de-listed” producers who could 
not continue to meet PQS’ quality standards, which is a further 
evidence of the PQS’ objectivity and reliability [2]. 
  Some national authorities will also review and approve 
products which, for patent reasons, cannot be sold in their 
national markets. The US FDA reviews drugs for use abroad 
via  the US PEPFAR program, for example. Also, Health 
Canada has reviewed and approved fixed-dose combination 
antiretroviral products manufactured in Canada for export to 
Rwanda under Canada’s export compulsory license regime 
(called “C-9” after the Canadian legislation authorizing such 
production) [3]. Thus, there are opportunities for UNITAID 
and, in the future, other funding and procurement authorities, 
to find ways of ensuring that the fixed-dose ARVs produced 
via a patent pool system can be quality-assured by objective, 
internationally-recognized bodies [4]. 
POSSIBLE POSITIVE IMPACT OF PATENT POOLS 
FOR INNOVATION 
  As noted above, a well-designed patent pool needs not 
have a negative impact on innovation for new and improved 
ARVs. Furthermore, if set up correctly, a patent pool could 
even promote greater innovation in ARV development to 
meet patients’ needs, particularly for affected populations in 
resource-poor settings most impacted by the AIDS 
pandemic. 
  Such improved innovation is particularly valid for the 
development of fixed-dose combination products for 
resource-poor settings, including for pediatric formulations 
[5]. While a few innovative pharmaceutical companies have 
developed fixed-dose combination products (some in 
collaboration with other innovative firms, some using own-
company products only), not all valid combinations of ARVs 
recommended by WHO for use in resource-poor settings are 
available in fixed-dose format. There are certainly technical 
challenges to producing high-quality and effective fixed dose 
combinations of ARVs, but patent issues can also play a role 
in slowing the development of fixed-dose combinations 
involving products from different patent-holders. If the 
relevant patents are included voluntarily into a patent pool, 
however, than other pharmaceutical companies can draw 
upon them to find innovative and possibly more effective 
ways to combine them in a fixed-dose format most 
appropriate for resource-poor settings. 
  Indeed, to make a patent pool most effectively promote 
innovation in ARV development, the patents of leading 
generic firms who are making fixed-dose combination 
products should also be voluntarily included in the pool. 
These product and process patents from generic producers 
can be very important in stimulating not only new 
combinations of products, but also in creating improved 
methods of combining and manufacturing fixed-dose 
combination products. By expanding the pool to include 
generics as well as innovative pharmaceutical companies, 
there will be greater possibilities for effective collaboration 
and more creative research in ARV innovation. 
CRITERIA FOR A PATENT POOL FOR ARVs 
•  The pool must be voluntary in nature. Compulsory 
inclusion of ARV patents in a patent pool could have 
a chilling effect on future innovation. 
•  Incentives for voluntary participation can be important. 
For example, major national or international 
procurement agencies could give significant preferences 
to purchasing ARV products developed via  a patent 
pool, such as granting a higher price or pledging 
guarantees to purchase large volumes of such products 
via advance marketing commitments. 
•  In line with patent pools in other industries, only 
those companies contributing to the pool should be 
allowed to draw on the patents in the pool. This 
would be an incentive for companies to join the pool, 
as only members would be able to benefit from the 
expanded access to other companies’s patents. Such a 
requirement would not exclude generic companies, as 
generic producers of fixed-dose combinations could 
contribute to the pool their process patents relevant 
for manufacturing fixed-dose combination products. 
•  The patent pool should focus on developing fixed-
dose combinations for resource-poor settings most 
impacted by the AIDS pandemic. Such a focus would 
address the greatest global need in terms of ARV 
care. Furthermore, focusing on such poor markets 
will allay the concerns of some innovative companies 
that participation in the patent pool could hurt their 
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ARV supply to the poorest countries is given at a “at 
cost” or “below cost” basis, there should be no 
additional financial loss to companies if they 
participate in a patent pool. Indeed, by working more 
collaboratively with others, including generics, there 
could be less of a financial burden on the innovative 
companies to supply such resource-poor markets. A 
focus on resource-poor countries should also be 
linked with ensuring that the products are not unduly 
diverted, so that the intended recipients can indeed 
benefit from these products. 
•  Even with such a focus on the needs of the poorest, 
patients in richer and mid-income countries can also 
benefit from the increased innovation arising from an 
effective patent pool, as the innovative combination 
products arising from such a pool could become 
eventually available in the mid-income and other 
markets. 
•  In order to ensure credibility with innovative and 
generic companies, as well as with other partners, the 
patent pool needs to be organized and managed by a 
reputable international organization. UNITAID is 
taking the lead in this effort and, given UNITAID’s 
unique structure and sustainable financing mechanism, 
is most likely to make a patent pool for ARVs a 
success [6]. Thus, UNITAID’s experience will be an 
important guide in the development of an ARV patent 
pool for innovation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
  The concept of a patent pool for antiretrovirals has been 
subject of much discussion in international health policy 
circles for several years. Strong concerns have been 
expressed regarding the possible impact of a patent pool on 
innovation in ARV development. However, a voluntary and 
well-designed patent pool, involving both innovative and 
generic manufacturers, focused on developing fixed-dose 
combinations for resource-poor markets with the greatest 
need, could actually stimulate increased innovation to meet 
these needs. Indeed, by bringing together the major ARV 
producers worldwide to collaborate on developing products 
which will meet the needs of the poorest, an ARV patent 
pool could create significant public health benefits. 
  UNITAID has taken the lead in designing and 
implementing such a pool and UNITAID’s experience will 
have important lessons for policy-makers in the future. 
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